



By Chris McGreal

水资源是以色列同邻里关系的核心



# Water Lies Heart of Israel's Relationship With Neighbours

时事经纬·链接

17

**译者点评:**前不久,以色列同土耳其签署了异乎寻常的武器换水协议。不管协议是否付诸实施,水资源都是以色列同邻里关系的关键。阿拉伯国家军队的威胁已经被以色列的胜利及其武器的优势所淹没。但是,稀有水源之争一直困扰着中东。就以色列来说,对其岌岌可危的水源的威胁与阿拉伯军队对这个新兴犹太国家的生存的威胁一样严重。同时,叙利亚、土耳其、约旦和巴勒斯坦等国也对水资源有着巨大的需求。因此,历史上叙以、约以、巴以之间都为水资源进行过激烈的争夺甚至战争。以色列处于这场日益激烈的争夺有限水源所有权之战的核心。水源之争加剧了巴以冲突,困扰着叙以谈判,也对中东和平构成了最为严峻的挑战之一。选自英国《卫报》的这篇文章对以色列同邻里的水资源之争作了非常全面的介绍,可以作为中东水源之争的背景文章来阅读。

Ask Ariel Sharon about the Six Day war and he will tell you that the fighting of that momentous week in 1967 really began more than two years earlier as Israel responded not to Syria's tanks but its bulldozers.

Damascus was constructing a vast canal to divert the waters of two of the Jordan River's main tributaries away from Israel in an attempt to squeeze dry an already parched land. For Israel, the threat to its precarious<sup>1</sup> water supply was as great a challenge to the existence of the fledgling Jewish state as any Arab army. Artillery duels and the Israeli air force brought work to a halt. "People generally regard June 5 1967 as the day the Six Day war began," Mr Sharon wrote in his autobiography. "That is the official date. But, in reality, it started two-and-a-half years earlier, on the day Israel decided to act against the diversion of the Jordan. While the border disputes between Syria and ourselves were of great significance, the matter of water diversion was a stark issue of life and death."

The threat from Arab armies was buried by Is- ▶

去问问阿里尔·沙龙有关六日战争的事,他会告诉你,1967年那个重要的星期的战争早在两年多以前就开始了,当时以色列应对的不是叙利亚的坦克,而是它的推土机。

当时大马士革正在修建一条大水渠,要改变约旦河两条主要支流的流向,使它们不再流经以色列,企图将本已干涸的以色列土地榨干。对以色列来说,对其岌岌可危的水供给造成的威胁,犹如任何阿拉伯军队对这个新兴犹太国家的生存的挑战一样严重。在炮火和以色列空军的猛攻之下,工程停了下来。沙龙在他的自传中写道:"人们普遍认为,1967年6月5日是六日战争开始的日子。那是正式开战的日子。但实际上,早在两年半以前以色列决定采取行动反对约旦河改道那一天,战争就开始了。虽然叙利亚和我们之间的边界争端关系重大,但河水改道显然是个生死攸关的问题。"▶

1. precarious [pri'keəriəs] *adj.* 不稳定的;不安全的;充满危险的

raeli victories and the overwhelming technological weapons superiority it enjoys today, along with a stash<sup>2</sup> of secret atom bombs. But continued competition for scarce water supplies continued to dog the Middle East. Anwar Sadat<sup>3</sup> signed Egypt's peace accord with Israel in 1979 with a warning. "The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water," he said. Jordan's King Hussein said much the same 11 years later about his own country's peace treaty with Israel. The former UN secretary-general and ex-foreign minister of Egypt, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, forewarned of just such a war.

Last week, Turkey agreed an extraordinary plan to ship millions of tons of water in giant tankers to Israel in a deal linked to hi-tech weapons shipments to Ankara. Whether or not the deal goes ahead, Israel will continue to lie at the heart of growing competition for limited supplies of water—and disputes about ownership—that underpins the conflict with the Palestinians, afflicts negotiations with Syria and poses some of the hardest challenges to peace in the Middle East. The region's three major waterways—the Jordan, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Nile—serve a few countries well. Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt do not want for water, although that is sometimes at the expense of their neighbours: Syria remains bitter over Turkey's construction of a dam on the Euphrates that disrupted the river's flow across the border.

Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian territories are not so fortunate. Israel has the highest per capita consumption of water in the region and uses far more than it produces. Since 1967, it has met much of the demand by drawing it from the occupied territories while restricting Palestinian access, and by clinging to the Golan Heights as much for its crucial source of fresh water as any military strategic advantage from being able to see all the way to Damascus.

Israel relies on three key water sources: the \*Sea of Galilee<sup>4</sup> and two natural underground aquifers—the "mountain aquifer" in the occupied West Bank and the "coastal aquifer" in Israel. One or two dry years has a profound effect on the aquifers, along with Israel pumping far more water than is provided by replenishment. The Sea of Galilee fell to its lowest level in recorded history last summer. Winter rains have replenished it to a degree, but the water level still sits precariously close to the "red line" at which the national water authority says the sea's ecological stability will start to erode. However, not many take the red line seriously, given that the authority has ▶

以色列的胜利和它今日所拥有的在武器技术上的绝对优势以及它所储藏的秘密原子弹,淹没了阿拉伯国家军队的威胁。但是,对稀少的水资源持续不断的竞争继续困扰着中东。安瓦尔·萨达特1979年签署埃及同以色列的和平协议时提出了一个警告。他说:"惟一可能使埃及再次陷入战争的就是水资源问题。"11年后,约旦国王侯赛因在他的国家同以色列签署和约时也说了差不多同样的话。联合国前任秘书长、埃及前外长布特罗斯·布特罗斯-加利也曾预先警告过这样一场水源之争。

上周,土耳其同意了一项非同寻常的计划,即通过大运水船向以色列运送数百万吨水,这项计划是同以色列向安卡拉运送高技术武器捆绑在一起的。不管这项协议是否真的会付诸实施,以色列仍将处于日益激烈的有限水资源之争以及水资源所有权的争端的核心,从而加剧以巴冲突,困扰以叙谈判,并对中东和平提出一些最为严峻的挑战。中东地区的三大水道——约旦河、底格里斯河-幼发拉底河和尼罗河——使少数几个国家受益。土耳其、黎巴嫩和埃及不缺水,虽然有时是以牺牲邻国的利益为代价的;叙利亚对于土耳其在幼发拉底河上建大坝而使河水不流入叙利亚境内怀恨在心。

约旦、以色列和巴勒斯坦领土就不那么幸运了。以色列在该地区人均用水量最大,而且它的用水量大大超过产量。自从1967年以来,以色列对水的需求多半从它占领的领土获得,同时限制巴勒斯坦得到水,并且紧抓戈兰高地不放,其目的既是为了能够享有尽览大马士革的军事战略上的优势,也是为了那里的重要的淡水资源。

以色列依赖三大重要水源:加利利海和两个天然地下蓄水层——被占的约旦河西岸"山区蓄水层"和以色列的"沿海蓄水层"。一两年干旱就给蓄水层造成重大影响,而且以色列抽取的水大大超过蓄水层所得到的补充。去年夏天加利利海的水位降到了有史以来的最低点。冬季雨水对其有一定程度的补充,但水位仍然非常接近危险的"红色警戒线"。鉴于此,以色列国家水利管理局说,加利利海的生态稳定性将开始恶化。但是,没有多少人认真看待▶

lowered it several times over the years so that it is always kept below falling water levels. It is now 2.5m below its original designation. The coastal aquifer has fallen so low at times that it is in danger of irreversible contamination by salt water drawn in from the Mediterranean sea. As the water table falls, sea water percolates through coastal soil into the fresh water, making it undrinkable and useless for irrigation.

The chairman of the national water company, Uri Sagie, recently warned a conference of Israeli farmers that there is a growing and unbridgeable gap between production and consumption. "The water sources are being depleted without the deficit being restored, and there is no choice except to create additional sources in order to close the gap," he said. It is not a message the farmers like to hear, but there are some who blame them for Israel's predicament. The Jewish state has an abiding attachment to the kibbutz<sup>5</sup> dwellers who colonised the desert. They provided the foundations for modern-day Israel and shaped the myth of a brave, small people struggling against all odds. But today agriculture consumes two-thirds of Israel's water while contributing to just 2.5% of its gross domestic product. Irrigation, compounded by a growing number of swimming pools, is a leading cause of the gap between production and consumption.

But it is the Palestinians who are paying the price. Under the \*Oslo peace agreement<sup>6</sup>, Israel retained overall control of water from the West Bank. The Palestinians now regret the deal. "The defect is in the Oslo agreement," says Amjad Alewi, a hydrologist at the Palestinian Water Authority. "The fact is we can't even drill a well without approval from Israel, while they pump all the water they like into the settlements." More than 80% of water from the West Bank goes to Israel. The Palestinians are allotted just 18% of the water that is extracted from their own land. Palestinian villages and farmers are monitored by meters fitted to pumps and punished for overuse. Jewish settlers are not so constrained, and permitted to use more advanced ▶



红色警戒线, 因为以色列水利管理局在过去几年里将它下调了好几次, 所以它总是低于下降的水位。现在这条线已经比最初标明的地方低了 2.5 米。沿海的蓄水层有时降得非常低, 进而面临被来自地中海的咸水不可逆地污染的危险。随着地下水面的下降, 海水穿过沿海土层渗入淡水中, 使淡水变得不能饮用和灌溉。

以色列国家自来水公司董事长乌里·萨吉最近在以色列农民的一次会议上警告说, 产出和消耗之间的差距日益拉大, 无法弥合。他说: "水资源正在损耗, 缺口无法恢复。为了缩小差距, 我们除了寻找其他水资源之外别无选择。" 这不是农民爱听的消息, 但有些人却指责他们使以色列陷入困境。这个犹太国家对移居沙漠的基布兹居民有始终不渝的感情。是他们为现代的以色列奠定了基础, 创造了一个勇敢的少数人同一切困难作斗争的神话。可如今, 农业耗费了以色列 2/3 的水, 而农业产出却只占国内生产总值的 2.5%。灌溉, 加之游泳池日增, 是造成以色列水产出与消耗之间的差距的一个重要原因。

但是, 付出代价的是巴勒斯坦人。根据奥斯陆和平协议的规定, 以色列保留对约旦河西岸水资源的全面控制。现在, 巴勒斯坦后悔签署了这项协议。巴勒斯坦水利管理局的水文学家阿姆贾德·阿拉维说: "毛病出在奥斯陆协议上。事实是, 不经过以色列同意, 我们连一口井都不能挖, 而他们却随意把水抽到定居点去。" 约旦河西岸 80% 以上的水都到以色列去了。巴勒斯坦人只分配到从他们自己的土地上抽取出来的水的 18%。巴勒斯坦的村庄和农民受到了安装在水泵上的水表的监控, 如果使用过量, 就会受到惩罚。犹太定居者就没有受到这样的 ▶

2. stash [stæʃ] n. <美俚>贮藏处, 存放处; 藏匿地

3. 1970 年到 1981 年担任埃及总统, 因和平解决埃以冲突而同以色列总理贝京共获 1978 年诺贝尔和平奖, 1979 年签署埃以和平条约, 1981 年 10 月 6 日在开罗纳尔城广场主持庆祝十月战争 8 周年盛大阅兵式时不幸遇刺身亡。

4. 即太巴列湖 5. 以色列有名的基布兹农场, 即合作居留地, 尤指合作农场

6. 1993 年 9 月, 由巴勒斯坦解放组织和以色列在挪威首都奥斯陆达成的和平协议, 内容涉及巴勒斯坦在加沙和杰里科实行自治, 这是巴勒斯坦自治的第一个重要和平协议

pumping equipment that means the settlers use 10 times as much water per capita as each Palestinian.

"This has caused us huge problems," says Aleiwi. "Palestinians get less than 60 units a day when the international minimum is 150. The Israeli domestic use alone is 300 to 800 units. It's worse in Gaza. Much of the water is not potable. That's why they have a lot of health problems, a lot of diseases in knees and kidneys. How can it be that Jewish settlers get unlimited amounts of pure water and that just across a fence children have to drink polluted water?" The Palestinians accuse Israel not only of plundering their water but polluting it. Some Jewish settlements pump raw sewage straight into the streams of neighbouring Palestinian villages, contaminating water once used for drinking, cooking and irrigation. Others pipe waste into the ground, which inevitably feeds into the aquifers. Palestinian villages also dump their sewage into the ground. Aleiwi blames the Israelis for both problems.

Boutros-Ghali said recently that he believes water is now the principal obstacle to an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. "Water lies at the core of the problems in Israel. This is why [the Israelis] are interested in the occupied territories; not for the territory, but for the water within that territory," he said.

Then there are the Golan Heights, which the Syrians are keen to win back, in part to ease some of their own water supply problems. Opponents of a deal with Syria predict that relinquishing control of the Heights could cost Israel about one-third of its fresh water if the flow into the Sea of Galilee becomes contaminated, deliberately or otherwise. They also say that if Syria follows through on plans to build homes for hundreds of thousands of people on the Heights, it could badly pollute the entire sea.

Others see Israel's agreements with Jordan as the model for future agreements with the Palestinians and Syrians. The treaty provides a detailed breakdown for maintaining and sharing water resources, including an agreement by Israel to provide 25 million cubic metres of water to Jordan each year. There have been tensions, particularly when Israel said it was unable to deliver the quota because of poor rainfalls. But Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian hydrologists say that they have worked well together to try and clean up the Jordan river and on planning desalination projects and monitoring pollution. ■

限制, 他们可以使用更先进的抽水装置, 结果, 犹太定居者的人均用水量是巴勒斯坦人的 10 倍。

阿拉维说:“这给我们造成许许多多的问题。巴勒斯坦人每天用不到 60 个单位的水, 而国际最低使用标准是 150 个单位。以色列仅仅是家庭用水就达到 300 到 800 个单位。加沙地带的情况更为糟糕。那里的水多半不能饮用。这就是那里存在许多健康问题、许多人患有关节炎和肾病的原因。凭什么犹太定居者可以无限量地得到纯净的淡水, 而一墙之隔的孩子就得喝被污染的水呢?”巴勒斯坦人指责以色列人不仅掠夺了他们的水, 还污染了它。有些犹太人定居点将未经处理的污水直接排入了邻近巴勒斯坦村庄的溪流里, 污染了曾经用于饮用、做饭和灌溉的水源。还有一些人把污水排入地下, 使污水不可避免地流入了地下蓄水层。巴勒斯坦村庄也将污水排入地下。阿拉维认为这都是以色列的错。

布特罗斯-加利最近说, 他认为水资源现在是以巴达成协议的主要障碍。他说:“水资源是以色列问题的核心。这就是(以色列人)对其所占领的领土感兴趣的原因; 并不是为了那些领土, 而是为了领土上的水资源。”

接下来是戈兰高地, 叙利亚人渴望夺回它, 部分原因是为了缓解他们自己淡水供应的问题。以色列反对同叙利亚达成协议的人预测, 如果流入加利利海的水源受到污染——不管是故意的, 还是无意的——放弃对戈兰高地的控制权可能会使以色列失去约 1/3 的淡水。他们还说, 如果叙利亚坚持实施在戈兰高地为数十万人建造家园的计划, 整个加利利海都将受到严重污染。

还有一些人将以色列同约旦达成的协议视为今后以色列同巴勒斯坦人和叙利亚人达成协议的样板。两国的协定对维护和分享水资源制定了具体的细目分类, 其中包括以色列每年向约旦提供 2500 万立方米的水的协议。两国间也曾有过关系紧张的时候, 尤其是在以色列声称由于雨水少, 它无法提供配额水量的时候。但是, 以色列、约旦和巴勒斯坦的水文学家说, 在改善约旦河的水质、计划海水淡化项目以及监测水污染状况等方面, 他们通力合作。

(星文 摘译自 *The Guardian* Jan. 13, 2004)