



外交所面临的 核挑战

A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy

By Henry A. Kissinger

导读:在伊朗核危机的关键时刻,伊朗总统致信美国总统布什。美国前国务卿基辛格认为,不管伊朗出于何种动机,美国都需要首先确定自己的策略与目标。与朝核问题六方会谈相比,伊朗核问题几乎没有取得任何成果。目前是德、法、英三国在与伊朗谈判,但在这种关乎全世界和平与安全的问题上,应该让美国、俄罗斯和中国这些与伊朗核问题息息相关的国家参与进来。应该及早打破僵局,否则会被视为对新成员加入核俱乐部的默许,并引发灾难性的连锁反应。基辛格还认为,鉴于美、俄换届选举在即,应该缩小在核问题上的分歧,从冷战中吸取经验,用武力以外的途径解决核问题。

The recent letter from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Bush needs to be considered on several levels. It can be treated as a ploy to obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations¹ on Iran's disregard² of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This consideration, and the demagogic³ tone of the letter, merited its rejection by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. But the first direct approach by an Iranian leader to a U.S. president in more than 25 years may also have intentions beyond the tactical and propagandistic, and its demagoguery may be a way to get the radical part of the Iranian public used to dialogue with the United States. America's challenge is to define its own strategy and purposes regarding the most fateful issue confronting us today.

The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and *wind up⁴ in terrorist hands. The negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed. A failed diplomacy would leave us with a choice between the use of force or a world ►

伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德近日致信布什总统,此事需从几个层面加以考虑。当前,联合国安理会正在就伊朗无视《不扩散核武器条约》的做法进行商议,内贾德的这封信可以被视为旨在给安理会出难题的伎俩。这样的动机,再加上信中蛊惑人心的论调,难怪美国国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯置之不理。但这是在至少 25 年时间里,伊朗领导人首次直接与美国总统表示亲近,其中除了战术策略及宣传造势之外,也许还有别的意图,而信中蛊惑人心的论调也许是想让思想激进的那部分伊朗民众习惯于与美国对话。摆在美国面前的挑战是,面对当前我们所面临的最重大的问题,要确定我们需要采取何种策略以及想要达到何种目的。

世界正面临一种可怕的前景,即核武器将成为各国必备的武器,并最终落入恐怖分子之手。就朝鲜和伊朗核扩散问题展开的谈判是一个重要的分水岭。如果外交努力以失败告终,那么我们只能从以下两种结果中选择其一:要么动用武力,要么 ►

where restraint has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of countries that have the most to lose to restrain defiant fanatics. One need only imagine what would have happened had any of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Istanbul or Bali involved even the crudest nuclear weapon.

Of the two negotiations, the one on Korea—a six-party forum of Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and North Korea—seems more advanced than the four-party talk on Iran (among France, Germany, Britain and Iran). Last September an apparent agreement in principle was reached in Beijing that North Korea will give up its nuclear program if the other parties provide adequate assurances of security, economic help in the post-nuclear period and a substitute for the power generation allegedly lost by abandoning the nuclear program. But each side has demanded that the other fulfill all its obligations before it undertakes its own; a serious effort to discuss a concurrent⁵ schedule has been prevented by North Korea's tactic of *stringing out⁶ the period between each session, perhaps to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal.

With respect to Iran, there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is. Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program, in the absence of which no control over a weapons program is meaningful.

The public debate often focuses on whether the United States is prepared to engage in bilateral discussions with North Korea or Iran. With respect to Korea, that is a subsidiary issue. The six-power talks provide adequate opportunity for a bilateral exchange of views. What Pyongyang is attempting to achieve—and what the Bush administration has rightly resisted—is a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework, which would prevent other parties in the Beijing process from undertaking joint responsibilities. If bilateral talks replaced the six-party forum, some of America's present partners might choose to place the onus⁷ for breaking every deadlock on Washington, ►

接受这样的现实,即由于各国无力或因担心遭受重大损失而不愿制止无视国际规则、一心发展核武器的国家,限制性举措形同虚设。只需设想一下,如果有恐怖分子袭击纽约、华盛顿、伦敦、马德里、伊斯坦布尔或者巴厘岛,哪怕他使用的是最落后的核武器,会发生什么后果?

在两场谈判中,就朝鲜核问题展开的谈判——由日本、韩国、中国、美国、俄罗斯和朝鲜参与的六方会谈——似乎比就伊朗问题展开的四方会谈(参与国包括法国、德国、英国和伊朗)更有成效。去年9月,朝核会谈的六方显然在北京达成了原则上的协议,即朝鲜会有条件地放弃核计划,前提是其他各方要在朝鲜弃核以后确保向其提供足够的安全和经济上的帮助,并为朝鲜找到替代的发电方式,以弥补其所称的因放弃核计划而在发电方面蒙受的损失。不过各方均要求对方先履行其义务,而后自己才会履行义务;各方原本想通过讨论认真地制定一个共同的时间表,但由于朝鲜采取拖延手段,拉长了会谈的间隔,制定时间表的想法未能如愿。朝鲜之所以阻挠时间表的制定,也许是想多赢得一点时间,从而加强其核武器库的建设。

至于伊朗问题,谈判各方甚至没有就目标正式达成一致。伊朗拒绝接受国际社会对其铀浓缩计划实施控制,如果无法控制其铀浓缩计划,那么对伊朗核武器计划实施的任何控制都是没有意义的。

公共讨论的重点往往是美国是否准备与朝鲜或伊朗展开双边磋商。对于朝核问题来说,这是个次要问题。六方会谈提供了充足的双边交流看法的机会。平壤想达到的结果——布什政府理所当然地加以反对——是它与华盛顿在六方会谈的框架外单独进行谈判,这样一来,在北京参加会谈的其他各方就不用共同承担责任。如果双边会谈取代六方会谈,目前作为美国合作伙伴的一些国家可能会将打破所有僵局的责任都推给华盛►

1. deliberation [dɪˌlɪbə'reɪʃən] *n.* [常作~s] 商议, 审议, 评议

2. disregard [ˌdɪsɪr'gɑ:d] *n.* 不理睬, 不顾; 漠视; 不尊重

3. demagogic [ˌdemə'gɒɡɪk] *a.* 蛊惑人心的, 煽动的; (似) 蛊惑民心的政客的

4. wind up <□> (以...) 告终 (by, in, as)

5. concurrent [kən'kʌrənt] *a.* 共同(或同时)起作用的, 一致的

6. string out <□> 延长, 延伸

7. onus [ˈəʊnəs] *n.* (只用单) 责任; 负担; 义务

in effect isolating the United States.

The same considerations apply even more strongly to bilateral negotiations with Iran at this stage. Until now formal negotiations have been prevented by the memory of the hostage crisis, Iranian support of terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president. Nor does the Iranian president's letter remove these inhibitions⁸. Nevertheless, on a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies⁹, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate—especially in light of¹⁰ what is at stake.

An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a *de facto* acquiescence¹¹ by the international community in letting new entrants¹² into the nuclear club. In Asia, it would spell the near-certain addition of South Korea and Japan; in the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia could enter the field. In such a world, all significant industrial countries would consider nuclear weapons an indispensable¹³ status symbol. Radical elements throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere would gain strength from the successful defiance of the major nuclear powers.


The management of a nuclear-armed world would be infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various nuclear countries would not only have to maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process that would not necessarily follow the principles and practices evolved over decades among the existing nuclear states. They would also have the ability and incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in general confrontations. Especially Iran, and eventually other countries of similar orientation, would be able to use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities around the world. ►

顿,这实际上会让美国陷入孤立。

在目前这一阶段,这样的考虑甚至更适用于与伊朗的双边谈判。迄今为止,由于人质危机在人们的记忆中挥之不散,再加上伊朗对恐怖组织的支持,以及伊朗总统充满挑衅意味的言辞,美国 and 伊朗之间迟迟没有启动正式谈判。伊朗总统给美国总统的信也未能消除这些阻力。尽管如此,在这种直接关乎自身安全的问题上,美国不应该通过别国来进行磋商,不管这些国家是与其关系多么密切的盟友。如果美国准备就核扩散问题在六方会谈中与朝鲜谈判,而且准备与伊朗在巴格达就伊拉克安全问题展开磋商,那么一定有可能就伊朗核问题与德黑兰举行有美国参与的多边会谈——特别是考虑到在当前这样的紧急关头。

无限期持续的僵局事实上就相当于

国际社会对新成员加入核俱乐部的默许。在亚洲,这几乎肯定会让韩国和日本加入发展核武器的行列;在中东,像土耳其、埃及,甚至沙特阿拉伯这样的国家可能也会迈进核领域。在这样一个世界,所有重要的工业国都会将核武器视为不可或缺的地位象征。伊斯兰世界



An anti-aircraft machine-gun is seen in front of the Reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, in southern Iran, in February 2006.

以及其他地方的激进势力则会从成功挑衅核大国的做法中增强实力。

驾驭这个以核武器武装起来的世界比维持冷战期间两个超级大国因核威慑达成的平衡要复杂得多。各个核国家首先要保持与自己的对手之间因核威慑取得的平衡,这一过程并不一定遵循现有核国家几十年来形成的原则与做法。此外,核武器还会让它们有能力并激励其宣布自己是一些大规模对抗的利益方。特别是伊朗,最终还有其他与其有类似倾向的国家,就能够用核武器来保护自己在全世界各地开展的革命行动。►

There is an argument on behalf of acquiescing in proliferation which holds that new nuclear countries have proved responsible in the past. But this is not endorsed by experience. Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project; North Korea has been an active proliferator. In addition, the safeguarding of nuclear material on the territories of emerging nuclear countries is bound to be more porous¹⁴ and less sophisticated.

Diplomacy needs a new impetus. As a first step, the United States and its negotiating partners need to agree on how much time is available for negotiations. There seems to be general agreement that Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year; there is some disagreement about progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing. Estimates on how close Tehran is to producing its first nuclear weapon range from two to 10 years. Given the risks and stakes, this gap needs to be narrowed. Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of the fact that in 2008 governments in both Russia and the United States will change; this will impose a hiatus¹⁵ on diplomacy while the governments are preoccupied with transition and, in America, restaffing the executive branch.

The next step is to recognize the difference between multiparty negotiations and a preferred strategy of regime change. But none of the participants in the existing or foreseeable forums will support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change. Inevitably, a negotiation on nuclear disarmament will involve compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities and is, in that sense, incompatible with regime change.

Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue. The United States should oppose nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran regardless of the government that builds them.

The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win ▶

有人认为应该对核扩散持默许态度,该观点认为,从以往来看,新出现的核国家都表现出了负责任的一面。但是不能仅凭经验就对此加以认可。巴基斯坦通过阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗的研究项目将核技术扩散出去,朝鲜也一直是积极的核扩散者。此外,新兴核国家在保护国内核材料方面必然比现有核国家更多漏洞,更少经验。

需要给外交努力注入新的动力。首先,美国及其谈判伙伴需要就还剩下多少谈判时间达成一致。似乎得到公认的一点是,平壤正在生产的钚足够一年制造几枚核武器之用;不过在朝鲜没有进行核试验的情况下,在制造可实际用于作战的核武器上到底取得了多大进展,还存在一些分歧。至于德黑兰在多久以后能够制造出第一枚核武器,各方的估计数字从两年到十年不等。鉴于其中存在的风险,需要缩小这一差距。所有关于外交行动进度的想法必须考虑到这样一个事实:到2008年,俄罗斯和美国的政府都将换届;届时两国政府忙于政权交接,美国还要重新任命政府官员,这样一来,会造成外交行动的脱节。

下一步是要认识到多方谈判与政权更迭这一更可取的策略之间的区别。但是在目前以及可预见的将来开展的任何会谈中,没有哪个参与方会明确支持旨在实现政权更迭的政策。关于核裁军的谈判不可避免地要涉及到对安全 and 经济利益的补偿,只有这样,对方才会放弃制造核武器的能力,从这个意义上讲,核裁军谈判与政权更迭是不相容的。

如果把政权更迭作为通往无核化的道路,只会让问题变得复杂。美国应该反对朝鲜和伊朗拥有核武器,而不要管制造核武器的是谁领导的政府。

能够实现无核化的外交行动可与当年帮助打赢冷战的遏制政策相媲美。遏制 ▶

8. inhibition [ˌɪnhɪˈbɪʃən] *n.* <□> (对思想或行动所产生的)感情阻力;禁忌

9. proxy ['prɒksi] *n.* 代理人,替代者

10. in (the) light of 鉴于,由于

11. acquiescence [ˌækwiˈesəns] *n.* 默许;默认;默从;默然

同意

12. entrant [ˈentrənt] *n.* 新成员;新会员;新学员

13. indispensable [ˌɪndɪˈspensəbl] *a.* 必不可少的,必需的

14. porous ['pɔːrəs] *a.* <喻> 多漏洞的;松懈的

15. hiatus [haɪˈeɪtəs] *n.* 间断;裂口;空隙

the Cold War: no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change.

Though America is represented in the six-party forum by an exceptional diplomat in Christopher Hill, periodic engagement at a higher level is needed to give the necessary direction to his efforts. The objective should be an understanding regarding security and political evolution in Northeast Asia that requires no changes in sovereignty as part of the process of denuclearization but leaves open the prospect of Korean unification through negotiations or internal evolution.

Parallel considerations apply to the case of Iran. The current negotiating forum is highly dysfunctional. Three European countries in close coordination with the United States are acting partly as America's surrogate¹⁶. China and Russia do not participate in the negotiations but are involved when their consequences go before the U.N. Security Council—a procedure enabling Iran to *play off¹⁷ the nuclear powers against each other.

A more coherent forum for negotiation would combine the three European nations with the United States, China and Russia as the countries most directly affected and in the best position to act jointly in the Security Council. This could be set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution now under discussion. It would permit elaboration of the one hopeful scheme that has emerged in Iranian diplomacy. Put forward by Russia, it is to move certain enrichment operations out of Iran into Russia, thereby preventing clandestine¹⁸ weaponization. The new, broader forum could be used to establish an international enrichment program applicable to future nuclear technologies to curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation.

Obviously, nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented simply by multiplying negotiating forums. The experience with existing conferences demonstrates the capacity for procrastination¹⁹ and obfuscation²⁰. To be effective, diplomacy must involve a willingness to provide clear penalties for obstruction.

Only after we have created the requisite negotiating framework and explored all aspects of diplomacy should the issue of military measures be addressed. But neither►

政策具体来说就是,没有先发制人地给对手的外部安全构成挑战,而是坚决抵制对手向海外施加影响,并且依赖对手国内的力量来引发内部的变革。

虽然美国向朝核问题六方会谈派出了克里斯托弗·希尔这名杰出的外交官,但还是应该让级别更高的官员定期进行接触,从而给希尔的努力以必要的指导。这样做的目的应该是了解东北亚地区在安全和政治领域出现的变化,虽然不把主权的变迁作为无核化进程的一部分,但还是把通过谈判或内部的演变而实现朝鲜半岛统一作为一种可能。

同样的想法适用于伊朗。目前围绕伊朗核问题采取的谈判努力基本上无法发挥任何作用。与美国进行密切协调的(德、法、英)三个欧洲国家从某种程度上讲只相当于美国的替身。中国和俄罗斯并未参与谈判,但当谈判结果提交联合国安理会时——这一过程将使得伊朗让核大国之间相互争斗——伊朗核问题将牵涉到中俄两国。

一种更为协调一致的谈判框架是将(德、法、英)这三个欧洲国家与美国、中国及俄罗斯这些最直接地受到伊朗核问题影响的国家联合起来,从而以最大可能在安理会采取联合行动。可以在安理会目前正在讨论的议案获得通过后建立这样的谈判框架。这样一来,在针对伊朗核问题的外交行动中出现的有望取得成功的方案有可能得到进一步发展。这项方案是俄罗斯提出的,内容是将一些铀浓缩活动从伊朗转移到俄罗斯境内,从而防止伊朗用这些材料秘密研制核武器。可以通过这个新建立的、更广泛的谈判框架来制定一套适用于未来核技术的国际铀浓缩程序,以减少不加控制地扩散核武器这种迫在眉睫的危险。

显然,仅仅通过一次次的谈判并不能防止核扩散。从现有的会谈得出的经验表明,对手会采取拖延和迷惑策略。要让外交行动取得实效,必须表现出对阻挠行为作出明确惩罚的意愿。

只有在我们建立了必要的谈判框架,并尝试了各种外交途径后,才能再谈到采取军事措施的问题。但是在我们知道只能►

should force be rejected in principle and for all time before we know the circumstances in which this last resort should be considered.

The issue before the nations involved is similar to what the world faced in 1938 and at the beginning of the Cold War: whether to overcome fears and hesitancy about undertaking the difficult path demanded by necessity. The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war; the ability to master it in the immediate aftermath of World War II led to victory without war. The debates surrounding these issues will be conducted in the waning years of an American administration. On the surface, this may seem to guarantee partisanship. But thoughtful observers in both parties will know that the consequences of the decisions before us will have to be managed in a new administration. The nuclear issue, capable of destroying mankind, may thus, one hopes, bring us together in the end. ■

使用武力这最后的手段之前,还是应该坚决地摒弃武力。

有关各国所面临的问题与这个世界在 1938 年以及冷战开始时所面临的问题相似:是否应该克服恐惧和犹豫,走上必须要走的那条艰难道路。1938 年时由于未能经受住考验而导致了一场灾难性战争;二战结束后不久,因为掌握了应对的技巧,我们在不费一枪一弹的情况下就取得了胜利。在本届美国政府的影响日趋式微的今后几年里,大家会围绕这些问题展开讨论。从表面上看,这似乎必然会带来党派纷争。但是民主、共和两党内那些有思想的人会明白,不管我们做出何种决定,其结果则要由新一届政府来应对。核问题能够毁灭人类,因此但愿这个问题能够让我们最终走到一起。(正阳 摘译自

The Washington Post May 16, 2006)

16. surrogate ['sʌrəɡɪt] *n.* 替代者,代理人
17. play off (尤指为渔利而)使相斗
18. clandestine [klæn'destɪn] *a.* 秘密的,暗中的;私下的;偷偷摸摸(干)的
19. procrastination [prəʊ'kræstɪ'neɪʃən] *n.* 拖延,耽搁,因循
20. obfuscation [ˌɒbfʌ'skeɪʃən] *n.* 迷惑,糊涂



The United States is restoring full diplomatic relations with Libya and removing the North African country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, the State Department announced Monday. (美国)国务院周一(5月15日)宣布,美国全面恢复与叙利亚的外交关系,并将这个北非国家从“支持恐怖主义国家”的名单上删除。

(CNN May 15, 2006)



Six world powers—including all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—Thursday agreed on a plan for resuming negotiations with Iran—but only if Tehran agrees to suspend its manufacture of nuclear fuel. 包括联合国安理会 5 个常任理事国在内的 6 个世界大国周四(6月1日)达成一项共识:继续与伊朗进行谈判,但前提是伊朗同意中止其制造核燃料活动。

(CNN Jun. 1, 2006)



A soldier looks at the national flag after Montenegrin parliament deputies voted to proclaim independence in Podgorica June 3, 2006. The former Yugoslav republic of Montenegro declared independence on Saturday. 2006 年 6 月 3 日,在波德戈里察黑山议会代表投票宣告独立后,一名士兵注视着国旗。前南斯拉夫加盟共和国黑山周六(6月3日)宣告独立。

(Reuters Jun. 3, 2006)



Elementary school children attend an examination at a tent in Yogyakarta. Officials in Indonesia have revised down the death toll from a strong earthquake in Java to nearly 5,800, as new aid supplies helped survivors move forward on the road to recovery. 日惹地区的小学生在帐篷里参加考试。由于新的救援物资的到来帮助幸存者走上康复之路,印尼官方已将爪哇岛强烈地震中的遇难人数减少修正为近 5800 人。(AFP Jun. 5, 2006)

(刘春晓 摘译)