


对伊朗保持耐心



Try Patience With Iran

精读

By William D. Hartung

(1) To no one's surprise, yesterday's deadline for Iran to freeze its nuclear enrichment program in exchange for negotiations over potential economic and technological incentives passed without an agreement. On Monday, Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, told European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana that any negotiations would be a "long process."

(2) Considering the fact that Iran had already indicated it has no plans to respond to the proposal before mid-to-late August, the insistence of the six powers involved in the talks on setting deadlines that require Tehran to answer within a matter¹ of weeks seems puzzling, *to say the least². Do the six interlocutors—Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the U.S.—really want to give diplomacy time to work? Or are hardliners like the Cheney faction of the Bush administration lurking in the background trying to scuttle serious talks between the U.S. and Tehran before they even get started?

(3) Despite this week's developments, there are still avenues available for genuine diplomacy, if Washington chooses to pursue them within a reasonable time frame.

(4) The first obstacle that needs to be overcome if talks are to move forward is the U.S. demand that it will engage in talks with Tehran only after the Iranian leadership agrees to freeze all uranium enrichment activities. A more logical and effective way to spur negotiations would be to▶

昨天是要求伊朗冻结其核浓缩计划以就此换取可能的经济和技术奖励进行谈判的最后期限,这一天没有达成任何协议就过去了,没有人对此感到意外。伊朗最高核谈判专家阿里·拉里贾尼周一告诉欧盟外交政策高级代表哈维尔·索拉纳说,任何谈判都会是一个“漫长的过程”。

鉴于伊朗已经表明其不打算在8月中下旬之前对该建议做出回应的事实,参与谈判的六国坚持设定最后期限,要求德黑兰在数周内做出答复,这至少可以说有些令人费解。参与谈判的英国、法国、德国、中国、俄罗斯和美国六国果真要给外交斡旋以时间使其发挥作用吗?抑或是布什政府中躲在幕后的切尼派那样的强硬路线者企图在美伊谈判甚至尚未开始前就将认真的谈判搅黄了?

尽管本周事态有新的发展,如果华盛顿决定在一个合理的时间框架内去进行外交活动的话,进行真正的外交活动的途径仍然是存在的。

如果让谈判继续进行下去,需要克服的第一个障碍就是美国的要求,即只有在伊朗领导层同意冻结其所有核浓缩活动之后美国才会与德黑兰进行谈判。促进谈判的一个更符合逻辑和有效的方式就▶

proceed on a step-by-step basis, beginning with a U.S. agreement to speak directly with Iranian leaders.

(5) Iran has plenty of reasons to resist putting its main *bargaining chip³ on the table before it has any indications of changes in U.S. behavior. As Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration officials have asserted on numerous occasions, the military option is “still on the table” *with respect to⁴ Iran’s nuclear program. It has not been made clear whether military action means conventional air strikes on Iranian facilities, or efforts to overthrow the regime through covert means, or the extreme step of using a tactical nuclear weapon to target Iran’s nuclear installations.

(6) At a minimum, talks must begin with an explicit U.S. pledge to take both regime change and the potential use of nuclear weapons “off the table.”

(7) Mastering nuclear technology has strong nationalist support in Iran, whether or not it leads to the development of nuclear weapons. But Iran is surrounded by states possessing nuclear weapons—Israel, Russia, and Pakistan—and Iranian leaders may view this strategic situation, along with ongoing U.S. threats, as reason enough to either develop a nuclear weapon or keep its intentions in that regard ambiguous. Before any Iranian leader takes the politically risky step of suspending its nuclear program there would have to be some indication that its security would be protected.

(8) Successful anti-nuclear diplomacy also needs to *dispense with⁵ the unnecessarily rushed deadlines that have been pressed by the Bush administration. President George W. Bush has indicated that the current offer to Iran will only be available for “weeks or months” before it is rescinded⁶ and harsher measures are pursued. This practice of setting false deadlines is eerily⁷ similar to U.S. behavior in the run-up to the war with Iraq, when distorted intelligence and a willful opposition to letting United Nations’ weapons inspectors finish their jobs fueled the drive to war.

(9) Somewhere along the way the issue of “nuclear hypocrisy⁸” will also have to be addressed. The United States currently has 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads in ►

是以逐步进行为基础——先从美国同意与伊朗领导人进行直接对话开始。

在尚无任何迹象表明美国的行为有所改变之前,伊朗有许多理由拒绝将其主要的谈判筹码摆到桌面上来。正如副总统迪克·切尼和其他政府官员已在许多场合坚称,就怎样处理伊朗的核计划而言,军事选择“依然是要加以考虑的”,只是没有明确说明军事行动是对伊朗的设施进行常规空袭,还是通过秘密手段将现政权推翻,或者是采取极端措施使用战术核武器对伊朗核设施实施打击。

谈判必须在美国明确保证“放弃”政权变更和可能使用核武的情况下才能开始,这是起码的要求。

在伊朗,无论是否会导致发展核武器,掌握核技术都得到国民的强有力支持。但是,伊朗毕竟处在拥有核武器的以色列、俄罗斯和巴基斯坦等国的包围之中;伊朗领导人可以把这一战略态势连同正在进行的美国的恫吓看作是发展核武器、或者是对其在这个方面的意图继续含糊其辞的充足理由。在任何一位伊朗领导人采取中止核计划的政治冒险步骤之前,必须得到该国安全将受到保护的某种表态。

要想使反对核扩散的外交努力获得成功,还需要摒弃不必要的、在布什政府催促下匆匆设定的最后期限,因为乔治·W.布什总统说过,目前向伊朗提出的解决方案只在“数周或数月”的时间内有效,过后无效,紧接着将采取更加严厉的措施。这种设置假定最后期限的做法与美国准备与伊拉克开战前的行为可怕地相似——当时被曲解的情报和执意反对让联合国武器核查专家完成调查任务刺激了开战的欲望。

到了一定阶段,“在核问题上说一套做一套”的问题也必须加以解决。美国 ►

1. matter ['mætə(r)] *n.* [表示数量] 近似量

2. to say the least 至少可以说

3. bargaining chip (谈判中一方所拥有的) 可进行讨价还价的筹码,有利条件

4. with respect to 关于,至于;就…而言;在…方面

5. dispense with sb/sth 摆脱某人(某事物)

6. rescind [ri'sind] *vt.* 废除,取消

7. eerily ['iərəli] *ad.* 可怕地;怪异地

8. hypocrisy [hi'pɒkrəsi] *n.* 伪善(行为);虚假的虔诚


its stockpile, including 5,735 on active status. Iran, on the other hand, appears to be seeking the capability to build one or more nuclear weapons, a task that will take it five to 10 years by most estimates. This “do as I say, not as I do” approach to nuclear weapons production undermines U.S. leverage over Iran and other nuclear “wannabes.”

(10) Although the Bush administration’s body language makes it seem as if an Iranian nuclear bomb is an imminent threat, its production won’t happen for years, if ever. This leaves months and years available for diplomacy, not the weeks or months favored by the Bush administration.

(11) A patient approach to negotiating with Iran should be reinforced by the fact that the United States has no viable military options. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are adamantly opposed to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, and thankfully, their opinions are likely to prevail on this subject. Regime change is unlikely without U.S. “boots on the ground,” an impossibility with U.S. troops bogged down in Iraq, not to mention the much greater challenge involved in attacking and occupying a country of nearly 70 million people.

(12) The outlines of a deal would have to involve U.S. political recognition and economic assistance to Iran—backed up by the European Union, Russia, and China—in exchange for sharp curbs on Iran’s nuclear activities. These could include a moratorium⁹ on uranium enrichment until U.N. inspectors are allowed to do intensive investigations to locate major Iranian nuclear facilities; and eventual allowance of a focused nuclear power program in Iran under tight and intrusive international inspections. This would *call Iran’s bluff¹⁰ by allowing nuclear power—the only thing they claim to want—while clamping down in a way that will make it nearly impossible to pursue nuclear weapons.

(13) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the true political leader of Iran, while suggesting on the one hand that there is “no use” negotiating with the U.S. over his nation’s



A general view of Bushehr nuclear power plant at the Iranian Persian Gulf port of Bushehr, 1200 kms south of Tehran in February 2006.

目前储备有 10000 枚战略核弹头, 其中 5735 枚处于服役状态。而伊朗好像只是在力争获得制造一枚或多枚核武器的能力。根据多数估计, 伊朗要完成这个任务需要花费 5 到 10 年的时间。对核武器生产的这种“按我说的去做, 而不是照我做的去做”的立场削弱了美国对伊朗和其他“想成

为”核武国家的影响力。

虽然布什政府的表现似乎弄得伊朗的核炸弹成了迫在眉睫的威胁, 其实, 即使伊朗具备了条件, 在数年内也不会出现核武器。如此说来, 留给外交斡旋的时间当有数月乃至数年, 而不是布什政府喜欢设定的数周或数月。

鉴于美国尚没有切实可行的军事选择, 耐心地与伊朗谈判的态度更应该得到支持。参谋长联席会议坚决反对使用战术核武器打击伊朗的核设施——所幸的是, 他们的意见在这个问题上很可能会占上风。没有美国军队的“地面行动”, 政权更迭是不会实现的, 而美国部队在伊拉克已陷入了泥沼, 美军“地面行动”也没有可能实现, 更不用说进攻和占领近 7000 万人口的国家所面临的更大的挑战了。

双方达成一项协议的大体内容不能不涉及美国对伊朗的政治承认和经济援助(欧盟、俄罗斯和中国给予支持), 以换取对伊朗核活动的严格限制, 这些限制可包括在联合国核查人员被允许赴伊朗进行彻底调查以确定其主要核设施的地点之前中止浓缩铀活动; 最终允许其在严厉、强行的国际核查下在伊朗实施仅限于发电的核计划。通过允许其搞核电——他们声称唯一想要的东西——与伊朗摊牌, 同时用某种方式给它戴上紧箍咒, 使其几乎不可能致力于制造核武器。

伊朗真正的政治领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊一方面暗示在该国核计划问题上与美国谈判“没有什么用处”, 但同

nuclear program, has also indicated that “we are willing to negotiate over controls, inspections, and international guarantees... The ground for such negotiations has been prepared.”

(14) An Iranian nuclear power program with strict international controls may be the best deal available. It is well worth pursuing.

(15) Ultimately, what is needed is a non-discriminatory approach to nuclear weapons, in which nuclear-armed states like Russia, the U.S., France, China, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, and Israel agree to reduce or eliminate their arsenals in exchange for stricter monitoring of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. The more countries that develop nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that one will be used in some future conflict. Heading off that catastrophe requires action not just by Iran, but by all nuclear-armed and aspiring nuclear weapons states.

William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. ■

时又表示“我们愿意就控制、核查以及国际保障等问题进行谈判……进行这些谈判的基础已经准备就绪”。

让伊朗在严格的国际控制下实施核电计划也许是最好的解决办法了,值得继续努力。

归根结底,要真正解决问题需要的是在核武问题上采取非歧视性的态度,俄罗斯、美国、法国、中国、英国、印度、巴基斯坦以及以色列等核武装国家同意削减或消除其核武库,以换取对所有国家(无论是核国家,还是无核国家)进行更严格的监控。发展核武器的国家越多,就越有可能在未来某次冲突中某个国家会使用它。要避免那样一场灾难,不仅需要伊朗采取行动,而且需要所有的核武装国家和有志制造核武的国家行动起来。

威廉·D. 哈通是世界政策研究所武器贸易资料中心主任。

9. moratorium [ˌmɒrəˈtɔːrɪəm] n. 暂停,中止;禁止
10. call sb's bluff 要某人摊牌;接受某人挑战

背景介绍:美国在入侵并占领伊拉克之后,便将目光转向被其称为“邪恶轴心”国家之一的伊朗。伊朗是石油生产大国,对美国而言有重要的战略意义。美国的能源政策决定了它不能放弃这个国家。美国凭借其实力,与西方大国一起,在浓缩铀问题上给伊朗定下一个最后解决期限,威胁此“限期”一过,美国就要采取更加严厉的措施。现在它所设定的期限已过,美国将何去何从?让我们拭目以待。世界政策研究所武器贸易资料中心主任威廉·D. 哈通撰写了“对伊朗保持耐心”一文,提出“在核武问题上要采取非歧视性立场”,认为要“避免在未来冲突中某个国家会使用核武器”的那样一场灾难,不仅需要伊朗采取行动,而且需要所有的核武装国家和有志制造核武器的国家采取行动。

语言点: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: 阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊 1939 年出生于伊朗东部圣城马什哈德的一个宗教世家,少年时开始接受神学方面的专门训练。1989 年被负责选择伊朗最高领导人的专家会议选举为新领袖,接替去世的宗教领袖霍梅尼。1994 年被推选为伊斯兰教什叶派的精神领袖。哈梅内伊常常表示,伊斯兰共和国根据伊斯兰教义从来都不寻求发展或获取核武器。他认为伊朗绝对拥有和平利用核技术的权利,坚信核武器对于击败敌人并非是必要的东西。他曾说:“正像伊朗在过去 25 年之内所做的那样,伊朗民族依靠信念、决心、警惕和团结,就会打败敌人。”

第(1)自然段: Ali Larijani: 阿里·拉里贾尼从 1994 年到 2004 年曾任伊朗伊斯兰共和国广播电台台长,并兼任伊斯兰文化及指导部部长。现在他是伊朗最高领袖派到最高国家安全委员会的代表。他曾经说过:在核技术上做出任何让步都是最大的叛国罪。

第(1)自然段: Javier Solana: 哈维尔·索拉纳 1942 年 7 月 14 日出生于西班牙首都马德里的一个富裕家庭,父亲是物理学家。1968 年他在美国获物理学博士学位。他是西班牙工人社会党党员,1977 年当选为众议员。曾出任文化大臣、教育和科学大臣、外交大臣。曾任北约第 9 任秘书长,现在是欧盟负责外交和安全政策事务的负责人、西欧联盟秘书长和欧盟军备局局长。注: Javier 在西班牙语中“J”读作“h”音。

第(2)自然段: Or are hardliners like the Cheney faction of the Bush administration lurking in the background trying to scuttle serious talks between the U.S. and Tehran before they even get started: “Lurking in the background”, “潜藏在背景中”,即指躲在后面。“To scuttle serious talks”中的“scuttle”一词意为“放弃、破坏、使成泡影”,如“Scuttle any chance of peace”(“破坏了一切和平的机会”)。

第(5)自然段: The military option is “still on the table” with respect to Iran’s nuclear program: “On the table” 是个短语,意思是“加以考虑”。

第(6)自然段: … to take both regime change and the potential use of nuclear weapons “off the table”: “Off the table”是个短语,意思是“不予考虑”。请注意“table”的英美不同用法:英国人说“to table sth”是“将…提交讨论”。如“A set of parliamentary questions tabled by Frank Field.” (“由弗兰克·菲尔德正式提交的一组议会质询问题。”)而当美国人说“to table sth”时,他是在说“将…暂缓审议”。如“The investigation was temporarily tabled due to more pressing business.” (“由于有更紧要的任务,调查暂缓进行。”)。

第(9)自然段: Somewhere along the way the issue of “nuclear hypocrisy” will also have to be addressed: 即指布什政府一方面要求别的国家放弃其核武器而自己却不履行自己有关裁军的义务、兑现自己的承诺,说一套、做一套的行为。

第(9)自然段: Iran, on the other hand, appears to be seeking the capability to build one or more nuclear weapons: “Seeking the capability”如果翻译成“寻求…能力”听起来在中文动词上搭配不对,所以将这一部分翻译成“而伊朗好像力争获得拥有制造一枚或多枚核武器的能力”。


第(9)自然段: This “do as I say, not as I do” approach to nuclear weapons production undermines U.S. leverage over Iran and other nuclear “wannabes.”: 这里指的是美国在核武问题上居高临下的双重标准: 你要按照老子说的去做(即你不能制造核武器), 你不要按照老子做的去做(即老子制造核武器, 你不要学)。Other nuclear “wannabes”: 美国用法, 即“want to be”。

第(11)自然段: U.S. “boots on the ground”: 美国英语军事俚语, 系指根据军事命令被部署到某地的人员, “boot”原指二次世界大战时美国应征入伍的新兵。

第(12)自然段: A focused nuclear power program: “focused”是“limited, restricted”的意思, 即核电计划的规模只集中在发核电上, 绝对不能越雷池一步, 即不能搞核武器, 故译作“仅限发电的核电力计划”。

第(12)自然段: This would call Iran’s bluff by allowing nuclear power—the only thing they claim to want—while clamping down in a way that will make it nearly impossible to pursue nuclear weapons: “call Iran’s bluff” “要与伊朗摊牌”的意思, 这里指逼伊朗亮出全部底牌。“clamping down”即“(对…)进行压制; (对…)强行限制; (对…)进行取缔”的意思。

(范守义 译注自 TomPaine.com Jul. 12, 2006)




Time (Aug. 14, 2006) 地狱中的生活

In more than 20 trips to the ravaged city, TIME’s Aparisim Ghosh has navigated countless perils. His extraordinary story offers a rare insight into the daily life of Iraqi citizens. 在 20 多次踏临这一被战火蹂躏之城的过程中,《时代》杂志的阿帕里希姆·高希亲历的险境数不胜数。他以非同寻常的经历向人们展示了一个了解伊拉克平民日常生活的珍贵视角。




BusinessWeek (Aug. 14, 2006) 18 个月与 6000 万美元

BusinessWeek talks about Digg.com’s Kevin Rose and the new wave of young entrepreneurs running the hottest of the top 100 Web 2.0 companies. 《商业周刊》讲述了 Digg.com 的凯文·罗斯和新一代年轻企业家如何经营最热门的 Web 2.0 公司, 它们都位居前 100 名之列。



Fortune (Jul. 24, 2006) 对不起, 杰克!

Once upon a time, there was a route to success that corporate America agreed on. But in today’s fast-changing landscape, that old formula is getting tired. The Six Sigma master was once the undisputed authority in management. But Fortune is finding that today’s smart CEOs are following a different set of rules. 从前, 美国企业界有一条众所公认的成功之路。但在当今快速变化的时代背景下, 这一旧有的准则已日渐陈腐。这位提出了“6 个西格马”理论的大师曾经是管理学界无可置疑的权威, 但《财富》杂志发现, 当今一些精明的 CEO 们正在遵循着一套不同的规则。



Wired (Aug. 14, 2006) 技术运用指南

We live in the age of DIY. Knowing how to use the technology that surrounds you is good—a little creative hacking is even better. This special section is your instruction book on how to do, well, anything. 我们生活在“自己动手”的时代。懂得如何使用身边的技术装备对你很有好处——要是再有一点儿创造性的黑客技术就更好了。本期的特别报道便指导你如何做好——嗯——任何事情。(仲剑强 摘译)