



America's spies have changed their minds. But a nuclear Iran remains a danger

美国间谍改变了主意。然而拥有核武器的伊朗依旧是个危险

精读

压力管用！ （“高度确信”）

Pressure works (“high confidence”)

(1) If the consequences were not so serious, it would be tempting to mock the fiascos¹ and flip-flops² of America's intelligence services. Before 2003 they said that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and was seeking nuclear ones. They were wrong. In 2005 they said that Iran had a secret nuclear programme and was determined to get a bomb. Now they say they were wrong about that too.

(2) This week's national intelligence assessment says with “high confidence” that although Iran was indeed working on a bomb until the autumn of 2003 it then stopped. By the middle of this year it had probably (“moderate confidence”) not started again. And unless it got fuel for a bomb from abroad it would take at least until late 2009 (“moderate confidence”) but more likely between 2010 and 2015 to make it at home.

(3) What is the baffled³ layman⁴ to *make of⁵ this? First that intelligence is neither art nor science but a system of best guesses based on incomplete evidence. If new evidence suggests that the previous guesses were wrong, it is a good thing that spies are willing to say so. Some of the outraged hawks who want America to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities accuse the spies of sexing down their latest Iran dossier⁶ in order to make amends⁷ for having sexed up the one that led America into a war in Iraq. But that would imply a truly impressive conspiracy between the 16 agencies that signed the report. Of course, the spies' new assessment may be wrong, as their previous ones proved to be. But it is most unlikely to ►

如果不会引起太严重的后果，那么将美国情报部门的尴尬结局和出尔反尔嘲讽一番还是挺有意思的。在2003年之前，他们说伊拉克拥有生化武器并且正在寻求核武器。结果，他们错了。2005年，他们说伊朗有秘密核武计划并且决心造出核武器来。现在他们说他们又搞错了。

本周的美国国家情报评估报告“高度确信”地指出直到2003年秋之前伊朗曾的确在造一枚核弹，不过之后就停了。到今年年中，伊朗或许（中度确信）没有重启该计划。并且除非伊朗从国外获取制造核弹的燃料，它至少要到2009年晚些时候（中度确信），但更有可能是2010到2015年之间才能在国内造出核弹。

被弄得懵懵懂懂的局外人要如何理解这些呢？首先，情报既不是艺术也不是科学，而是一个根据不完整的证据做出最佳猜测的系统。如果有新的证据表明先前的猜测错了，那么间谍们愿意这样承认则是件好事。一些想要美国去轰炸伊朗核设施的鹰派们大为光火，指控那些间谍们低估其最新的伊朗情报评估，以弥补先前对伊拉克情报的夸大进而导致美国在伊拉克开战之虞。但是那就意味着签署该报告的16个情报部门之间真的有过非同寻常的密谋。当然，间谍们的新评估也许是错的，正如他们先前的那些报告被证明是错的一样，但是不►

be a tissue⁸ of lies.

(4) For that very reason, however, relieved⁹ doves who think the spectre¹⁰ of a nuclear Iran or of an American attack has now disappeared had better read the report again. Its final sentence says (“high confidence”) that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it chooses. As to what “eventually” means, the assessment has not changed: it was always late 2009 at the earliest but more probably the middle of the next decade. As to whether Iran will do so, the spies say (“moderate-to-high confidence”) that “at a minimum” it is *keeping the option open¹¹.

(5) That is troubling, because Iran can continue to work towards a bomb without resuming the secret programme America now thinks it stopped in 2003. That programme was about “weaponisation”: the fiddly¹² business of making a device that can set off a chain reaction in nuclear fuel. But creating such a warhead is the easier part of building a bomb. Harder *by far¹³ is making the fuel. And, as the report notes, making the fuel is precisely what Iran continues to do *in defiance of¹⁴ UN Security Council resolutions at its uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz. For now, it is true, Iran is enriching the uranium at below weapons grade. It says it is doing so only in order to power reactors to produce electricity. But it has no such reactors. And to get the uranium to weapons grade it has only to run the stuff often enough through Natanz’s centrifuges¹⁵.

(6) In short, nothing in the new assessment makes the story Iran tells about Natanz any less fishy¹⁶ or the dangers posed by its dash to enrich uranium any less troubling. But it has utterly changed the politics of the issue. The case for ►



可能全是一派谎言。

然而正因如此,那些认为由拥有核武器的伊朗或一场由美国对伊朗进行的攻击所产生的恐惧现已不复存在而颇感宽心的鸽派们最好把那份报告再看一遍。报告的最后一句说(高度确信)伊朗具备最终生产出核武器的科技及工业生产能力,如果伊朗决定这样做的话。至于“最终”是何时评估报告的提法并未改变:依然是最早也要到2009年晚些时候,但更可能是在未来十年的中期。至于伊朗是否会这样做,间谍们说“中度到高度确信”伊朗“在最小程度上”,保留着研发核武器的选择权。

那可就麻烦了,因为伊朗可以继续研制出核弹无须恢复美国现在认为其在2003年就停止的秘密计划。那项计划是形成“武器化”,即为制造一个可以引起核燃料进行连锁反应的装置而进行的高精度的工作。但制造这样一枚弹头是制造一枚核弹较为容易的部分;更难的是制造燃料。并且,正如报告中所言,制造燃料

正是伊朗公然违抗联合国安理会决议继续在其纳坦兹铀浓缩工厂所作之事。目前,伊朗的确正在进行武器级别之下的铀浓缩作业。伊朗称,仍在这样做仅是为用于发电的反应堆提供动力;可是伊朗并没有这样的反应堆。而要得到武器

级别的铀,伊朗只需通过纳坦兹工厂的离心机将原料提炼足够次数即可。

总之,新的评估报告中没有哪一点使伊朗编织的关于纳坦兹的故事不那么可疑;也没有使伊朗急着制造浓缩铀的危险不那么令人感到不安。但是它彻底改变了这个问题的政 ►

1. fiasco[fɪˈæskəʊ] n. 完全失败;可耻的失败;可笑的结局
2. flip-flop[ˈflɪpflop] n.(方向、观点、态度等的) 突然倒转, 突变
3. baffle[ˈbæfəl] vt. 使困惑, 难住
4. layman[ˈleɪmən] n.(尤指不谙法律、医学等专业的) 门外汉, 外行
5. make of 理解; 了解
6. dossier[ˈdɒsɪəl] n.(有关某个人或某件事的) 材料汇编, 卷宗, 档案
7. amends[əˈmendz] [复] n. [用作单或复] 赔罪; 赔偿
8. tissue[ˈtɪʃjuː] n.(罗织编造的) 一套, 一系列
9. relieved[rɪˈliːvd] a. 宽心的, 宽慰的; 表示宽慰的

10. spectre[ˈspektə(r)] n. 缠绕心头的忧虑, 恐惧
11. keep(或 leave) (one's) options open 暂不作决定, 保留灵活的选择权
12. fiddly[ˈfɪdli] a. <口> 需要手巧的; 要求极度精确的
13. by far (与形容词、副词的比较级或最高级连用) 大大地; ...得多
14. in defiance of 违抗; 无视, 不顾
15. centrifuge[ˈsentriˌfjuːdʒ] n. 离心(分离) 机
16. fishy[ˈfɪʃi] a. <口> 可疑的; 靠不住的

American preemption¹⁷ now becomes almost impossible to sell either at home or abroad. That is probably a good thing, given that a military attack was always likelier to restore Iran's determination to build a bomb than destroy its ability to get one. Unfortunately, the report may also make it harder for America and Europe to maintain, let alone sharpen, the sanctions the world has imposed in order to make Iran stop work at Natanz.

Talk if necessary, but keep up the sanctions

(7) Since the spies say Iran stopped its bomb-making in 2003 because of world pressure, relaxing it now would be perverse¹⁸. But to keep the world on side, America may have to show new flexibility. For example, while tightening sanctions, it could offer to talk to Iran about all aspects of their troubled relations, even before work at Natanz stopped. Iran might refuse. But that would at least make it clear which side was the spoiler.

治层面的考量。美国先发制人的理由现今在国内或在国外几乎都无法受到认可。这或许是一件好事情，因为军事进攻更能促使伊朗恢复研制核弹的决心而非摧毁其生产核弹的能力。可惜，报告使美国 and 欧洲更难坚持使全世界迫使伊朗停止在纳坦兹的作业而实施的制裁，更别说加大制裁力度了。

有必要就谈，但要保持制裁

既然间谍们说由于世界的压力，伊朗在 2003 年就停止制造核弹，那么现在减小压力则有悖常理。但为了把全世界团结到一块儿，美国或许得显示出新的灵活性。比如，在加紧制裁的同时，美国甚至可以在纳坦兹的作业停止之前主动就两国间麻烦关系的方方面面进行谈判。伊朗或许会拒绝。但那至少会使究竟哪一方是搅局者变得清清楚楚。

17. preemption[ˌpriːˈempjən] n. 先发制人；预先制止

18. perverse[ˈpɜːvɜːs] a. 有悖常情的；不合人意的

背景知识:

伊朗核能源开发活动始于 20 世纪 50 年代，曾得到美国等西方国家支持。80 年代美伊交恶，美开始指责伊朗以“和平利用核能”为掩护秘密发展核武器，并对其采取“遏制”政策。2003 年 2 月，伊朗宣布能够提炼出为其核电站提供燃料的铀，美国旋即警告伊朗停止与铀浓缩相关的活动。是年 9 月国际原子能机构首次通过决议，要求伊朗尽快签署《不扩散核武器条约》附加议定书，终止提炼浓缩铀试验。12 月，法、德、英三国代表欧盟从中斡旋，伊朗正式签署《不扩散核武器条约》附加议定书。2005 年 12 月，俄罗斯提出伊俄两国在俄境内建立铀浓缩联合企业的提议，以确保伊朗核技术不会用于军事目的。但伊朗表示其铀浓缩活动必须在本国境内进行。2006 年 1 月 3 日，伊朗宣布已恢复中止两年多的核燃料研究工作，此举引起国际社会的强烈反应。2006 年 7 月 31 日，联合国安理会通过了关于伊朗核问题的决议，要求伊朗于 8 月 31 日之前暂停所有与铀浓缩相关的活动。但伊朗并未执行。2007 年 3 月 24 日，联合国安理会以一致赞成的表决结果，通过了关于伊朗核问题的第 1747 号决议。新决议加大了对伊朗核能和导弹计划相关领域的制裁，同时强调继续寻求通过谈判解决伊核问题。2007 年 12 月 3 日，美国 16 家情报机构联合发布的“国家情报评估”报告指出，伊朗在 2003 年就已经中止了设计和制造原子弹的计划，也停止了秘密的铀浓缩工作。

第 2 段 本文所谈到的“national intelligence assessment”正式名称是“National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)”，这是美国国家情报局向总统和总统安全顾问所提交的定期报告，本次报告名称是“Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007”。该报告包含截至 2007 年 10 月 31 日的情报，对其中所使用的词语有专门定义。评估中的“confidence”系指信息的来源、范围和质量的评估等级，定为“high, moderate, or low”三级。在文中“confidence”可以解释为“准确、可靠、确信、有把握”等意思。我们从上下文和叙述者角度考虑，决定选择“确信”这个词。该报告的行文特点即是对每一句重要的判断(“Key Judgment”)都要指出其可信度的等级，如下面的引语所示：

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program¹; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran's announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work.



EU leaders gathered in Lisbon Thursday to sign a landmark treaty which they hope will revitalize Europe and avoid the referendum death which befell the constitution it is designed to replace. (AFP Dec. 13, 2007) 欧盟各国领导人周四(12月13日)会聚在里斯本签订一份里程碑式协议。他们希望该协议将会重振欧洲并避免重蹈其要替代的欧盟宪法在公投中告结的覆辙。

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Kongo shot down a dummy ballistic missile in a test about 100 miles (160 km) above the Pacific on Monday, a first for a U.S. ally, Japanese and U.S. forces said. (Reuters Dec. 18, 2007) 日美两国军方称,日本海上自卫队驱逐舰“金刚”号宙斯盾舰在周一(12月17日)的试验中击落了一枚距太平洋上空约100英里(160公里)的模拟弹道导弹。这是美国盟友的首次试射。



Kenya's President Mwai Kibaki said on Saturday he was ready to form a government of national unity to end post-election violence that has killed 300 people and forced 250,000 to flee their homes. (Reuters Jan. 5, 2008) 肯尼亚总统姆瓦伊·齐贝吉周六(1月5日)称,他准备组建一个民族联合政府以结束大选后的暴力冲突。这次冲突已造成300人死亡,25万人被迫逃离家园。

Washington on Tuesday warned Iran against making threatening maneuvers towards American ships after a tense weekend standoff in the Strait of Hormuz, while Tehran denied anything other than “routine” interaction between the fleets. (AFP Jan. 8, 2008) 华盛顿于周二(1月8日)就周末发生在霍尔木兹海峡的紧张对峙警告伊朗不要对美国船只作出威胁之举。而德黑兰则予以否认,称此举只是舰队之间的“正常”接触。(杨盼盼 摘译)



语言点:

第3段 sex up: 惹火; 夸大; 系美国总统乔治·W. 布什于2003年指伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器时所造, 并一度成为时髦语。与此相对的便是“sex down”。

第3段 16 agencies: 系指 Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence。NIE 是综合以上情报机构的情报而写成。

第6段 ... nothing in the new assessment makes the story Iran tells about Natanz any less fishy or the dangers posed by its dash to enrich uranium any less troubling: “any less”与否定的表达一起用表示“某事不可信”的意思。否定的翻译有时是使用反译法; 这里反话正译之后, 完全是正面判断的口气, 是与原文的意图不一致的, 所以还是依照原文的句法来翻译。“新的评估报告中没有哪一点使伊朗编织的关于纳坦兹的故事不那么可疑; 也没有使伊朗急着制造浓缩铀的危险不那么令人感到不安。”

第7段 keep the world on side: 即 “retaining support from the rest of the world, or having the rest of the world agreeing with, or at least understanding why the pressure in question should be maintained”; 也就是让全世界站在美国的一边。

(范守义 译注自 The Economist Dec. 6, 2007)