



A Sensible Path on Iran

解决伊朗问题的理智途径

精读

By Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom

(1) Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons. The seemingly clever combination of the use of “sticks” and “carrots,” including the frequent official hints of an American military option “remaining *on the table¹,” simply intensifies Iran’s desire to have its own nuclear arsenal. Alas, such a heavy-handed² “sticks” and “carrots” policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its *calls for³ regime change.

(2) Consider countries that could have quickly become nuclear weapon states had they been treated similarly. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa had nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, each for different reasons. Had the United States threatened to change their regimes if they would not, probably none would have complied⁴. But when “sticks” and “carrots” failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States rapidly accommodated⁵ both, preferring good relations with them to hostile ones. What does this suggest to leaders in Iran?

(3) To look at the issue another way, imagine if China, a signatory⁶ to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a country that has deliberately not engaged in a nuclear arms race with Russia or the United States, threatened to change the American regime if it did not begin a steady destruction of its nuclear arsenal. The threat would have an arguable⁷ legal basis, because all treaty signatories promised long ago to reduce their arsenals, eventually to zero. The American reaction, of course, would be explosive public opposition to such a demand. ►

目前美国对德黑兰政权的政策几乎必然会导致出现一个拥有核武器的伊朗。看上去似乎是把“大棒”与“胡萝卜”巧妙地结合使用，包括官方频繁地暗示美国军事选择“仍待考虑”，只不过强化了伊朗要拥有自己核武库的愿望。唉！这样笨拙的“大棒”加“胡萝卜”政策或许对驴管用，但是对于较真的国家不灵。如果白宫放弃其军事行动的威胁和改变政权的要求，美国倒会有更大的成功机会。

料想那些受到相似待遇的国家也会很快变成拥有核武器的国家。巴西、阿根廷和南非曾有过核武器计划，但是由于各自不同的原因放弃了。倘若他们不愿意放弃，美国就威胁改变其政权的话，大概没有一个国家会服从。但是当“大棒”加“胡萝卜”未能阻止印度和巴基斯坦获得核武器后，美国很快顺应了这两个国家，宁可与其交好而非交恶。这对于伊朗领导人有何启示呢？

再换个思路看这个问题，想象一下：如果作为《不扩散核武器条约》的签约国、且有意不与俄罗斯或美国搞核竞赛的中国威胁美国说，假若美国不开始持续地销毁其核武库，中国就要改变美国的政权，又将如何？这一威胁会有一个可论证的法律依据，因为所有的条约签字国在很早之前就允诺削减其核武库存，且最终完全削除核武器。当然，美国的反应会是强烈地公开反对这一要求。►

1. on the table <美> 被搁置着的；留待日后考虑的

2. heavy-handed['hevi'hændɪd] a. 笨拙的，粗手粗脚的；过分强制的

3. call for 呼吁，要求

4. comply[kəm'plaɪ] vi. 遵从；依从；顺从；服从

5. accommodate[ə'kɒmədeɪt] vt. 顺应，适应（新情况）

6. signatory['sɪgnətəri] n.（文件的）签署者 或签署国等

7. arguable['ɑ:gjuəbl] a. 可论证的；有论据的

(4) A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours. Neither a U.S. air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities nor a less effective Israeli one could do more than merely *set back⁸ Iran's nuclear program. In either case, the United States would be held accountable and would have to pay the price resulting from likely Iranian reactions. These would almost certainly involve destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, and serious efforts to disrupt⁹ the flow of oil, *at the very least¹⁰ generating a massive increase in its already high cost. The turmoil in the Middle East resulting from a preemptive¹¹ attack on Iran would hurt America and eventually Israel, too.

(5) Given Iran's stated goals—a nuclear power capability but not nuclear weapons, as well as an alleged desire to discuss broader U.S.-Iranian security issues—a realistic policy would exploit this opening¹² to see what it might yield. The United States could indicate that it is prepared to negotiate, either on the basis of no preconditions by either side (though retaining the right to terminate the negotiations if Iran remains unyielding but begins to enrich its uranium beyond levels allowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty); or to negotiate on the basis of an Iranian willingness to suspend enrichment in return for simultaneous U.S. suspension of major economic and financial sanctions¹³.

(6) Such a broader and more flexible approach would increase the prospects of an international arrangement being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous¹⁴ nuclear energy program while minimizing the possibility that it could be rapidly transformed into a nuclear weapons program. The widely propagated¹⁵ notion of a suicidal Iran detonating¹⁶ its very first nuclear weapon against Israel is more the product of paranoia¹⁷ or demagoguery¹⁸ than of serious strategic calculus¹⁹. It cannot be the basis for U.S. policy, and it should not be for Israel's, either.

(7) An additional longer-range benefit of such a dramatically different diplomatic approach is that it could help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region. Eventually, Iran could even return to its long-standing and geopolitically natural pre-1979 policy of cooperative relations with Israel. One should note also in this connection Iranian hostility toward al-Qaeda, lately intensified by al-Qaeda's Web-based campaign urging ►

解决伊朗问题的成功途径必须兼顾伊朗的安全利益和我们的安全利益。美国空中打击伊朗核设施抑或是不那么奏效的以色列空袭都只会暂时拖延伊朗的核计划。在哪种情况下美国都要承担责任,都要对伊朗由此作出的可能反应付出代价。这些情况几乎必然导致中东地区以及阿富汗的不稳定,而中止石油持续供应的动真格的行动,至少会使已经高涨的油价再大幅上扬。对伊朗先发制人的攻击所导致的中东地区的混乱将会

伤害美国,且最终也会殃及以色列。

鉴于伊朗表明目标——要具备核动力的能力,但不是核武器,以及宣称讨论更广泛的美伊安全问题的愿望——一个现实的政策是利用这一机会,关注可能产生的结果。美国可能表示它准备谈判,或是在双方都不提先决条件的基础上(但是如



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果伊朗不妥协,而是超越《不扩散核武器条约》所允许的基准开始进行铀浓缩,则保留中止谈判的权利);或者在伊朗自愿暂停铀浓缩活动,以使美国同时中止重大经济和金融制裁的基础上进行谈判。

这种更宽泛和更灵活的方式会增加国际调解的可能性,调解旨在既顾及伊朗独立核能计划的愿望又使伊朗会迅速转而发展核武器计划的可能性降至最低。广为流传的说法是,自取灭亡的伊朗会针对以色列引爆其第一枚核武器,这更是臆想或煽动的产物,而非严肃的战略推测。这不能成为美国政策、亦不应是以色列政策的依据。

这一截然不同的外交方式所具有的另一更为长远的好处是,在稳定海湾地区方面,有助于使伊朗重回与美国战略合作的传统角色。最终,伊朗甚至会回归其1979年前的政策,即其长期的、从地缘政治上自然的与以色列的合作关系。人们还应该注意到,在这一方面伊朗对基地组织的敌意,近来又被基地组织在互联网上发起的鼓动美伊 ►

a U.S.-Iranian war, which could both weaken what al-Qaeda views as Iran's apostate²⁰ Shiite²¹ regime and bog²² America down in a prolonged regional conflict.

(8) Last but not least, consider that American sanctions have been deliberately obstructing Iran's efforts to increase its oil and natural gas outputs. That has contributed to the rising cost of energy. An eventual American-Iranian accommodation would significantly increase the flow of Iranian energy to the world market. Americans doubtless would prefer to pay less for filling their gas tanks than having to pay much more to finance a wider conflict in the Persian Gulf.

背景知识:

本文作者 Zbigniew Brzezinski(兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基) 和 William Odom(威廉·奥多姆) 两位作者都是美国安全事务专家, 长期关注国际安全问题, 尤其是对美国利益所在重大问题, 常以宏观的、历史的和向前看的眼光进行观察, 发表独到的见解, 并提出一些“变通”的而非强硬的外交政策建议, 对以西部牛仔风格著称的布什政府当是理性的规劝。

兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基: 1928 年 3 月 28 日生于波兰华沙, 1938 年随父母到加拿大, 1953 年从加拿大移居美国, 1958 年加入美国籍。布热津斯基曾于 1978 年夏天秘密访问中国, 就美国与中国建立外交关系同中国领导人磋商。

威廉·奥多姆: (1932.6.23- 2008.5.30), 美国陆军三星中将, 曾任里根政府国家安全局局长, 他批评布什政府侵略伊拉克的政策。在与布热津斯基合作的本篇文章发表 3 天后去世。

第 3 段 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 《不扩散核武器条约》, 它是英国、美国、苏联等 59 个国家 1968 年 1 月 7 日分别在伦敦、华盛顿和莫斯科签署的一项国际条约。该条约的宗旨是防止核扩散, 推动核裁军和促进和平利用核能的国际合作。该条约于 1970 年 3 日正式生效。该条约共有 11 条规定, 主要内容是: 有核国家不得向任何无核国家直接或间接转让核武器或核爆炸装置, 不帮助无核国家制造核武器; 无核国保证不研制、不接受和不谋求获取核武器; 停止核军备竞赛, 推动核裁军; 把和平核设施置于国际原子能机构的国际保障之下, 并在和平使用核能方面提供技术合作。

语言点:

在本文中“to accommodate”和“accommodation”共出现 4 次, 意思并非一致, 须根据上下文的具体情况作出调整:

第 2 段 ... the United States rapidly accommodated both: 在这句中意思是“adapt oneself; become adjusted”, 即对自己做出调整以适应新的状况。

第 4 段 A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours: 此句中是“to allow for”的意思, 即“顾及”或“考虑到”。

第 6 段 ... being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous nuclear energy program: 文中也是“to allow for”的意思。

第 8 段 An eventual American-Iranian accommodation would ...: 在句中是“Reconciliation or settlement of opposing views”的意思。

(范守义 译注自 The Washington Post May 27, 2008)

8. set back 推迟; 耽搁; 阻碍
9. disrupt[disˈrʌpt] vt. 中断; 扰乱
10. at the very least 至少
11. preemptive[ˈpriːmptɪv] a. 抢先的; 先发制人的
12. opening[ˈəʊp(ə)nɪŋ] n. 机会; 机遇
13. sanction[ˈsæŋkʃn] n. 制裁
14. autonomous[ɔːˈtɒnəməs] a. 自主的; 有主权的
15. propagate[ˈprɒpəˌgeɪt] vt. 宣传, 传播 观点、信仰等)

16. detonate[ˈdetəˌneɪt] vt. 引爆, 起爆
17. paranoia[ˌpærəˈnoɪə] n. 臆想; 凭空猜疑
18. demagoguery[ˌdeməˈɡɒɡəri] n. 蛊惑人心的宣传, 煽动; 煽动方法; 煽动主义
19. calculus[ˈkælkjʊləs] n. 演算(法); 计算(法)
20. apostate[əˈpɒsteɪt] a. 叛教的; 背信的; 变节的; 脱党的
21. Shiite[ˈʃiːaɪt] a. (伊斯兰教) 什叶派的; 什叶派教徒的