

## 以色列貌似疯狂实有理性的行为

导读：巴勒斯坦伊斯兰抵抗运动(哈马斯)2007年6月夺取对加沙地带的控制权后，视其为主要安全威胁之一的以色列便开始对加沙地带实施封锁。5月31日以色列军方在公海袭击一支驶往加沙地带的国际人道主义援助船队，造成数十人伤亡，死者中包括8名土耳其公民。在以外长拒绝就袭船事件道歉后，曾是以色列在中东地区唯一盟友的土耳其威胁与其断交。以色列冒天下之大不韪的行为出自何因？本文分析了中东格局的新走向及各国利益相争后的大国角力。



# The Method in Israel's Madness

By Pepe Escobar

Why would Israel, in a deliberate and methodical operation planned over a week in advance—according to statements by senior Israeli military commanders made in Hebrew-language media days before the attack—target an unarmed ship on a humanitarian mission flying the flag of Comoros<sup>1</sup>? (Unlike Turkey, Comoros is a party<sup>2</sup> of \*the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court<sup>3</sup>, which has jurisdiction<sup>4</sup> over war crimes committed on vessels of member states.)

Why would Israeli commandos<sup>5</sup> shoot nine unarmed activists dead with nine millimeter bullets at close range, between the eyes, in the top of the head, in the back of the head, in the chest, in the back, and in the legs—including an American citizen? (The final death toll may be 15, as six activists are still missing; Israeli army radio reported 16 dead early last Monday when the attack—took place on the Mavi Marmara, a part of the Free Gaza flotilla<sup>6</sup>.)

How could Israel think it would \*get away with it<sup>7</sup> by censoring video and photos—and then getting away with it all over again by refusing an international, independent commission to investigate the incident and subsequent cover-up?

Why, geopolitically, would Israel declare war on the \**de facto*<sup>8</sup> international community—from Muslim nations to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-countries to global \*public opinion<sup>9</sup>? ▶

为什么以色列提前一周就预谋好了(根据以色列高级军事指挥官在攻击前几天在希伯来语媒体发表的声明),一次蓄意而有章法地袭击一艘悬挂科摩罗国旗,非武装的人道主义救援船呢?与土耳其不同,科摩罗是国际刑事法院《罗马规约》的缔约方,该法院对发生在缔约国船只上的战争罪有管辖权。)

为什么以色列突击队员要射杀9名没有武装的志愿者(包括1名美国公民)而且是用9毫米子弹近距离射击两眼之间、头顶、后脑、胸部、背部和腿部呢?最终的死亡人数可能会上升至15人,因为6名志愿者仍然失踪;在“自由加沙运动”船队的“马维·马尔马拉”号上发生这起袭击事件后,以色列军方电台上周一早报道称有16人死亡。)

以色列怎么会认为它可以通过删剪视频和照片逃脱罪责,还可以通过拒绝独立的国际委员会调查该事件及事后的掩盖行为逃脱罪责?

从地缘政治角度看,为什么以色列会向事实上的国际社会宣战——从穆斯林国家到北约成员国,乃至全球民意? ▶

1. Comoros 科摩罗[印度洋西部非洲岛国]

2. party [ˈpɑ:ti] n. (条约、诉讼、争论等中的)一方,当事人

3. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 国际刑事法院《罗马规约》。国际刑事法院成立于2002年,其主要功能是对犯有种族屠杀罪、危害人类罪、战争罪、侵略罪的个人进行起诉和审判。国际刑事法院成立的基础是2002年6月1日开始生效的《罗马国际刑事法院规约》,因此该法

院仅对规约生效后的前述四种国际罪行有管辖权。

4. jurisdiction [ˌdʒʊərɪsˈdɪkʃn] n. 司法权,审判权,管辖权

5. commando [kəˈmɑ:ndəʊ] n. 突击队,突击手,突击队员

6. flotilla [fləʊˈtɪlə] n. (小)船队,小型舰队

7. get away with 做(坏事)而未受惩罚

8. *de facto* [diːˈfæktəʊ] n. <拉> (不论合法与否)实际上存在的

9. public opinion 舆论;民意

Is this merely a case of a “dysfunctional government”, as Bradley Burston wrote in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz . And strategically speaking, is there any method behind the madness? Or is the method actually the madness?

### Be afraid, be very afraid

There may be a very simple answer to all these questions: fear.

Let’s survey Israel’s possible motivations. A key Israeli motive to attack the humanitarian flotilla was to send a “signal” to Turkey about the Brazil and Turkey-mediated Iran nuclear fuel swap deal—as its success pre-empted<sup>10</sup> Israel’s pleas for a military strike on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Israel wants conflict between Washington and Tehran—and that means using the Israel lobby in Washington to sabotage<sup>11</sup> US President Barack Obama’s half-hearted attempts at finding any sort of agreement with Tehran over its uranium-enrichment program.

Israel wants a weak Turkey—\*out of the loop<sup>12</sup> both in the Middle East and the European Union (EU). Turkey is an emerging, key regional power now with good, stable relations with its neighbors. Turkey is key for the US: 70% of all supplies for US troops in Iraq go through the Incirlik base in Turkey. Turkey has troops fighting the US war in Afghanistan. Not to mention that Turkey—in Obama’s own terms—represents the key bridge between the West and the Muslim world.

The White House gave a wimpy<sup>13</sup> response, “The United States deeply regrets the loss of life and injuries sustained<sup>14</sup> and is currently working to understand the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.” This was also Washington’s signal to Turkey that the Brazil-Turkey mediation on the Iran nuclear fuel swap deal was \*not exactly<sup>15</sup> welcome.

Iran agreed last month with the leaders of Brazil and Turkey to send most of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey to be held \*in escrow<sup>16</sup> pending<sup>17</sup> delivery of fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor.

As much as Israel wants Turkey immersed in deep trouble with both Syria and Greece, and fighting a nasty<sup>18</sup> internal Kurdish problem, Ankara is not exactly trembling because of Israel’s “message”. In terms of conventional military ►

难道如布拉德利·伯斯顿在以色列《国土报》上所称,这只是“政府失灵”的又一例证?从战略角度讲,这种疯狂背后是否存在何种理性?或者这种理性其实已属疯狂?

怕,很怕

对这些问题,可能有一个很简单的答案:恐惧。

让我们审视一下以色列可能存在的动机。以方攻击人道主义救援船队的一个主要动机是就巴西和土耳其斡旋的伊朗核燃料交换协议向土方发出“信号”——如该协议成功,以色列空袭伊朗核设施的呼吁将失去意义。以色列希望看到美、伊发生冲突——这意味着要利用以色列在华盛顿的游说团体去刻意阻碍贝拉克·奥巴马就伊

朗铀浓缩计划与伊方达成某种协议的半心半意的努力。

以色列希望看到一个弱小的、在中东和欧盟都无发言权的土耳其。今天的土耳其是一个正在崛起的重要的地区大国,与邻国的关系良好而稳定。土耳其对美国至关重要:驻伊拉克美军 70%的



Turkish protesters shout anti-Israel slogans after the deadly raid on aid ships en route to Gaza.

补给物资要经由因吉利克基地补给。土军参与美军在阿富汗的作战行动。更不要说土耳其——用奥巴马自己的话说——就是西方和穆斯林世界的重要桥梁。

白宫的反应是温吞水式的:“美方对发生伤亡事件深表遗憾,并正在了解发生这场悲剧的详细情况。”这也是美国政府向土耳其发出的信号:巴西-土耳其斡旋的伊朗核燃料交换协议根本不受欢迎。

伊朗上月与巴西和土耳其的领导人达成协议,同意将其大部分低浓缩铀运送到土境内交第三方托管,直到提供德黑兰研究反应堆使用的燃料棒为止。

实际上以色列希望土耳其深陷与叙利亚、希腊关系的极度困境,且始终致力于解决国内严重的库尔德人问题,土政府根本没有因以色列的“信号”而焦虑。从常规 ►

strength, Turkey is ahead of Israel itself; and moreover it is a very important US NATO ally.

Another key Israeli motive was to undermine and in fact abort<sup>19</sup> any possibility of meaningful peaceful negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians—and to cut Turkey from the loop. Turkey is very much involved in the Palestinian tragedy. It is trying hard to breach the gap between \*Fatah and Hamas<sup>20</sup>. A key Israeli aim appears to be to sabotage any Turkish-led peace initiative to solve the Palestinian problem that includes the essential provision of a fully denuclearized Middle East—anathema<sup>21</sup> to (undeclared) nuclear power Israel.

To \*round it all up<sup>22</sup>, there is the crucial element of fear itself. As the once-fabled Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have struggled in battles with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, they have had to \*come to grips with<sup>23</sup> the fact that their tanks are now vulnerable to Russian-made rocket-propelled grenades; their planes will soon be vulnerable to Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles.

### The new axis in town

Iraqi Kurdistan<sup>24</sup> is now virtually independent—according to Washington's designs. Israel is robustly active everywhere in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the US actively supports the Iraq-based Kurdish Workers' Party separatists in eastern Anatolia<sup>25</sup> as well as Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) separatists in Iran and Kurdish separatists in Syria. The Turkish military spent no time analyzing these crucial developments. Their conclusion: NATO is not exactly a panacea<sup>26</sup>. We must focus on the Middle East.

And this has led to the ultimate Israeli nightmare. The new key axis in the Middle East is Turkey, Iran and Syria. It used to be only Iran and Syria. Its historical legitimacy simply cannot be questioned, as it unites Shi'ite Iran, ►

军力看,土强于以;此外,土耳其还是美国非常重要的北约盟友。

以色列的另一个主要动机是破坏,实际上是中止任何与巴勒斯坦和叙利亚进行有意义的和谈的可能性——并让土耳其失去影响力。土耳其已深深卷入了巴勒斯坦悲剧之中。它正努力消除法塔赫和哈马斯之间的分歧。以色列的主要目的似乎是破坏任何由土方发起的解决巴勒斯坦问题的和平倡议,包括一项使中东地区实现完全无核化的基本规定,这是以色列这个(未公开的)核国家所厌恶的。

综上所述,这里的关键因素就是恐惧。曾富有传奇色彩的以色列国防军(IDF)2006年与黎巴嫩真主党苦战,2008年又与加沙地带的哈马斯武装分子激战,他们已意识到并不得不设法处理棘手的现实;以军的坦克易受俄制火箭推进榴弹的威胁,战斗机不久之后也将易受俄制S-300地对空导弹的威胁。

### 新轴心国来了

伊拉克境内的库尔德斯坦现在实际上是独立的(按美国政府的意图正是如此),以色列在这里四处积极活动。同时,美国大力支持以伊拉克为基地的在东南安纳托利亚的库尔德工人党分离主义分子,以及在伊朗的库尔德斯坦自由生活党分离主义分子和在叙利亚的库尔德分离主义分子活动。土耳其军方一直在分析这些重要动向,结论是:加入北约并非万能之计,必须在中东下功夫。

这给以色列带来了最可怕的噩梦。中东新的关键轴心国是土耳其、伊朗和叙利亚,而以前只有伊朗和叙利亚。由于它联合了以什叶派穆斯林为主的伊朗,世俗的叙利亚和以逊尼派穆斯林为主的后奥斯曼土耳其,它的历史 ►

10. pre-empt [ˌpriːˈempt] *vt.* 抢在...之前行动,预先制止  
 11. sabotage [ˌsæbəˈteɪʒ] *vt.* 故意妨碍,捣乱,刻意阻碍  
 12. out of the loop 属(处理要务的)圈外人士  
 13. wimpy [ˈwɪmpɪ] *a.* <俚> 懦弱的,无用的,哭哭啼啼的  
 14. sustain [səˈsteɪn] *vt.* 遭受,蒙受,经受  
 15. not exactly (说反话时用)根本不,决不,一点也不  
 16. in escrow 根据协议由第三者暂为保管  
 17. pending [ˈpendɪŋ] *prep.* 在等待...之际,直到...时为止  
 18. nasty [ˈnɑːstɪ] *a.* 危险的,严重的  
 19. abort [əˈbɔːt] *vt.* 使(计划等)中途失败,使中止  
 20. Fatah and Hamas: 法塔赫和哈马斯。法塔赫是巴勒斯坦解放组织所属的最大一支武装力量,简称“巴勒斯坦民族解放运动”。哈马斯即“巴勒斯坦伊斯兰抵抗运动”,是巴勒斯坦一个宗教性的政治组织,反对同以色列和谈,并且不放弃以武力消灭以色列,并将巴

勒斯坦人对以色列的攻击行动称为“圣战”,从而建立由地中海到约旦河西岸,并以耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国。由于法塔赫与哈马斯政治主张不同,经常发生暴力冲突。  
 21. anathema [əˈnæθəmə] *n.* 令人厌恶的人(或事物);受诅咒的对象  
 22. round up 将...聚拢起来,使聚集  
 23. come to grips with 开始理解并着手处理难题  
 24. Kurdistan [ˌkɜːdɪˈstɑːn] 库尔德斯坦(西南亚)(库尔德人分布地区的习惯名称,疆界不明确,大致包括土耳其东南部、伊拉克东北部和伊朗西北部)  
 25. Anatolia [ˌænəˈtəʊljə] 安纳托利亚(土耳其的亚洲部分)  
 26. panacea [ˌpænəˈsiə] *n.* 治百病的灵药;<喻>万应药



secular Syria and post-Ottoman Sunni Turkey.

There are many fascinating side-effects of this cross-fertilization<sup>27</sup>—such as more than a million Iraqis, many of them very well educated, finding a new life in Syria. But the most remarkable effect of this axis is that it has smashed the same old divide-and-rule logic Western colonialism has been imposing on the Middle East for more than a century. Turkey's destiny may not be firmly attached to a fearful Europe that really does not want to embrace it after all; Turkey is to become once again a leader of the Muslim world.

Life for the new axis won't be easy. United States covert<sup>28</sup> operations have tried to destabilize Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—to no avail<sup>29</sup>. The same for US Central Intelligence Agency \*black ops<sup>30</sup> in Sistan-Balochistan province in southeast Iran, as a means to destabilize the regime in Tehran. And the same for shady covert ops meant to bring a new military dictatorship in Turkey. But while US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton perfects her vociferousness<sup>31</sup>, Assad, Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad got together this February in Syria and advanced their partnership.

Crucially, Russia immediately stepped in to fill the US-provoked void. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has been to Ankara and Damascus and has positioned himself in favor of full reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and a fully functional Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel.

Even US Central Command commander General David "I'm always positioning myself to 2012" Petraeus has been forced to publicly admit that US strategic ally Israel—because of the non-stop colonization of Palestine and the blockade it is enforcing in Gaza—has become an immense burden for US strategic designs.

Russia on the other hand supports the new Turkey, Syria and Iran politico-economic axis. Visa-free travel between Ankara and Moscow is now on. Russia's Rosatom and Atomstroyexport are finishing Iran's Bushehr nuclear power station this August; are discussing the building of other plants; and have clinched<sup>32</sup> a Turkish nuclear power ►

合理性根本不容置疑。

这种相互作用产生了很多有趣的意外结果——比如 100 余万伊拉克人(其中很多人受过良好教育)在叙利亚开始了新生活。但这一轴心最显著的结果就是它打破了西方殖民主义在中东强制推行了一个多世纪的老一套的分而治之的策略。土耳其的命运也许并非牢牢地与终究并不真正想接受它的忧心忡忡的欧洲绑在一起,它将再次成为穆斯林世界的领袖。

新轴心国的日子不会太好过。美国暗中活动试图动摇叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的统治,但并不成功。美国中情局在伊朗东南部的锡斯坦-俾路支省发起的试图颠覆伊朗政府的秘密行动也毫无进展。同样没有进展的还有

试图在土耳其建立新的军事独裁政府的秘密行动。尽管美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿提高调门表达意图,阿萨德、真主党的哈桑·纳斯鲁拉和伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈德-内贾德今年 2 月在叙利亚聚首,推进他们的伙伴关系。



*Iranian, Brazilian and Turkish foreign ministers brokered the nuclear fuel swap deal on 17 May 2010.*

至关重要的是,俄罗斯立即插手,填补了美国带来的真空。俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫先后赴安卡拉和大马士革,表明了支持法塔赫和哈马斯之间的完全和解,以及支持一个与以色列比邻相处、正常运转的巴勒斯坦国的立场。

甚至连自称“总是面向 2012 年考虑问题”的美军中央司令部司令戴维·彼得雷乌斯也不得不公开承认,美国的战略盟友以色列由于对巴勒斯坦不间断的殖民行为和对加沙地带的强行封锁,已经成为美国战略规划的巨大负担。

另一方面,俄罗斯则支持由土耳其、叙利亚和伊朗组成的新的政治-经济轴心。现在往返于安卡拉和莫斯科已互免签证了。俄罗斯原子能公司和原子能建设出口公司将于今年 8 月建成伊朗布什尔核电站,正讨论建设 ►

station deal worth US\$20 billion (Syria is also interested). Stroitransgaz and Gazprom will bring Syrian gas to Lebanon—as Israel prevents Lebanon from exploiting its considerable offshore reserves. Russia is \*on a roll<sup>33</sup>. Tehran will soon receive its already paid-for S-300 missiles. And Syria will soon get a new naval base.

In Pipelineistan, Russia and Turkey are now \*brothers in arms<sup>34</sup>. Russia will build a crucial Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline to bring Russian oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey is about to join the Russian South Stream gas pipeline—and that means a direct blow to the troubled US/EU-supported Nabucco.

Russia—just like Turkey—also wants a fully denuclearized Middle East, which implies a non-nuclear Israel. This will be discussed at the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency.

Thus, essentially, Israel fears the new Turkey, Syria and Iran as much as it fears Russian support for it. A new Middle East is being born—and there seems to be only one place for Israel: isolation.

Israel's "mad dog" strategy—conceived by former military leader Moshe Dayan—is not exactly an exercise in fitting in. Even centrist Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman, an establishment<sup>35</sup> icon at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote an essay under the title "Israel as a Strategic Liability<sup>36</sup>?"

Big Brother Washington may be—forever—blind to it; but if you are a state and your strategy is to configure<sup>37</sup> yourself as South Africa at the twilight<sup>38</sup> of apartheid<sup>39</sup>—by the way, at the time Israel was trying to sell nuclear weapons to South Africa—method is the last thing to be found in your madness.

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其他核电厂，还赢得了价值 200 亿美元的土耳其核电站建设项目(叙利亚也有兴趣)。俄罗斯斯特洛伊天然气运输公司和高兹普罗姆天然气公司将把叙利亚的天然气输送到黎巴嫩，因为以色列阻止黎巴嫩开发其可观的近海天然气储备。俄罗斯连连得手，不久将向伊朗政府交付已经付款的 S-300 型导弹，向叙利亚交付新建的海军基地。

在石油管道领域，俄罗斯和土耳其目前已成为战友。俄将建设重要的萨姆松-杰伊汉管道，将俄产石油从黑海输送至地中海。此外，土耳其将参与俄罗斯“南溪”天然气管道的建设，这对美国、欧盟支持的已麻烦重重的“纳布科”线来说是直接的打击。

俄罗斯同土耳其一样，也希望中东实现完全无核化，即以色列不拥核。这个问题将在联合国国际原子能机构中予以讨论。

因此，从根本上说，以色列既惧怕土耳其、叙利亚和伊朗组成的新轴心，也惧怕俄罗斯对该轴心的支持。一个新的中东即将诞生，而以色列似乎只有一个结局：被孤立。

以色列的“疯狗战略”——由前军事领导人摩西·达扬发明——并非适应现实之举。甚至连中间派的中东分析家安东尼·科德斯曼(美国战略与国际问题研究中心的权威专家)也写下了一篇以《以色列是否是战略负担?》为题的文章。

美国政府这个老大哥也许会(永远)对这个问题视而不见，但如果作为一个国家，且在战略上是将自己定位为种族分离即将结束时的南非(顺便说一句，目前以色列正试图向南非出售核武器)，那么貌似疯狂中的这种理性是最不理性的行为。

佩佩·埃斯科巴尔是《全球斯坦：全球化世界如何转化成流动战争》(Nimble 出版社 2007)和 Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge 的作者。他新近刚刚出版 Obama does Globalistan (Nimble 出版社 2009)。

(黄景睿 译注自 Asia Times Jun. 8, 2010)

27. cross-fertilization [ˌkrɒsfɜːtɪləɪzəʃən] n. (思想、文化、技术等)相互得益的交流 相互作用  
28. covert [ˈkɒvət] a. 暗中的 隐藏的 秘密的  
29. to no avail 没有什么效果 不成功  
30. black op: 即 black operations 秘密行动  
31. vociferousness [vəʊˈsɪfərəsnɪs] n. 大声叫喊 喧嚷  
32. clinch [klɪntʃ] vt. 取得 赢得

33. on a roll 连连获胜中 连续交好运中  
34. brothers in arms 战友们  
35. establishment [ɪˈstæblɪʃmənt] n. (统称)权威人士  
36. liability [ˌlaɪəˈbɪləti] n. 惹麻烦的人(或事)  
37. configure [kənˈfɪgə(r)] vt. 使成形 (按特定形式)安装 装配  
38. twilight [ˈtwɪlaɪt] n. 衰落时期 (人的)暮年 晚期  
39. apartheid [əˈpɑːtaɪt] n. 种族隔离(前南非政府推行的政策)